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During the question-and-answer portion of the 2010 
APA Central Division John Dewey Lecture, titled “On Not 
Knowing Where You Are Going,” speaker Alasdair MacIntyre 
remarked that in the future “Philosophy in the United States 
will be found in community colleges and other strange 
places.” While this comment caught many by surprise, it 
points to an evolving presence for philosophy in two-year 
and community colleges. The aim of this newsletter is to 
foster a rich discussion concerning the nature and issues 
that characterize that evolution, as well as to highlight the 
great differences one finds from institution to institution, 
and the great diversity of faculty and students who populate 
their campuses. 
Accordingly, this first issue (and perhaps those that will 
follow) does not adhere to a single theme or topic. Instead, 
it reflects the very broad call for papers adopted by our 
committee, a breadth that we believe best gathers and 
presents the reality that is the twenty-first century two-year 
and community college. It is not the normal school of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, or the vocational-
technical school of sixty years ago. And, while workforce 
programs do make up a sizeable portion of the two-year 
and community college curriculum, it is not unreasonable 
to point out that the same is true of many programs found 
at four-year and graduate institutions. What is unreasonable 
is to pretend that the two-year and community college 
mission is somehow inferior to that of those other higher 
ed institutions, or its faculty less sophisticated in their 
thinking than those at four-year colleges and universities. 
While there is certainly a greater emphasis on teaching 
in the former and on research in the latter, this does not 
entail that excellence in either is necessarily distributed 
accordingly. One reason there is a need for a newsletter 
specifically devoted to two-year and community colleges is 
that the challenges of teaching at two-year and community 
colleges, broadly conceived, not only include pedagogical 
issues, but professional and workload issues that differ 
significantly from those at senior colleges and universities. 
This is clearly a work in progress by any measure, but 
work that we believe is important to the health and well­
being of both the profession and philosophy. We welcome 
your comments, and, more importantly, we welcome your 
articles for publication in future issues. 
ARTICLES 
Thoughts on the Consolidation of a Two-
Year College and a Research University 
Eric Morton 
GEORGIA PERIMETER COLLEGE 
George Rainbolt 
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
While mergers of colleges and universities have occurred 
as long as there have been colleges and universities, it 
seems likely that current political and economic factors 
will lead to an increase in such mergers in the years to 
come. In particular, falling state appropriations combined 
with resistance to increasing tuition puts institutions 
under the kind of financial pressure that makes merger 
an attractive option. What follows is a description of an 
in-progress consolidation of a two-year college and a 
research university. While there are risks, we believe that 
this consolidation will be beneficial to students and faculty 
at both institutions. 
In January of 2015, the University System of Georgia (the 
System) announced the consolidation of Georgia State 
University (GSU) and Georgia Perimeter College (GPC). The 
two institutions legally became one this past January, and 
the first combined registration will be for the fall semester 
of 2016. This consolidation is part of a larger System-
wide plan. A total of twelve institutions have been or are 
being consolidated into six. This will take the System from 
thirty-five institutions to twenty-nine. GSU is Carnegie-
classified as a research university (very high research 
activity) with 32,000 students (25,000 undergraduates and 
7,000 graduate students) on a main campus in downtown 
Atlanta. GPC was Carnegie-classified as an associate’s 
institution with 20,000 students on five campuses mostly in 
the northeastern suburbs of Atlanta and a significant online 
presence. 
THE SHAPE OF THE CONSOLIDATED
INSTITUTION 
In some mergers, both academic departments and 
non-academic units are merged. For example, in the 
consolidation of Kennesaw State University and Southern 
Polytechnic State University (two other institutions in 
the System), the standard practice was for academic 
departments in the same field to combine. The English 
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faculty of each institution were combined into one English 
department. Similarly, the combined institution has one 
Registrar’s Office. 
The GSU-GPC consolidation is taking a different shape. 
GPC has become a distinct college (named “Perimeter 
College”) within Georgia State, just as the College of Arts 
and Sciences and the College of Law are distinct colleges 
within GSU. Incorporating Perimeter College as a distinct 
college allows the students and faculty to be kept largely 
distinct from the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences 
and the other colleges in the same way that the students 
and faculty of the College of Law are by and large kept 
distinct and separate from the College of Arts and Sciences. 
There are distinct admissions criteria, with the Perimeter 
College retaining the admissions criteria of an associate’s 
institution. Similarly, tuition rates remain lower for 
students registered in associate’s degree programs at 
Perimeter College. The courses offered at the freshman 
and sophomore levels are identical. The “common core” 
of basic distribution requirements for the associate’s and 
bachelor’s degrees has been unified. However, students 
enrolled in associate’s programs and students enrolled 
in bachelor’s programs are not going to be in the same 
classrooms. Moreover, the faculty members that have been 
teaching in the same discipline (for example, philosophy) 
at different colleges have not been merged into single 
academic departments, but rather have been organized 
into distinct departments within their respective colleges. 
Normally, students will move from Perimeter College to 
the other GSU colleges when they receive their associate’s 
degree. There are distinct degrees. Perimeter College offers 
only the associate’s degree, and the other colleges do offer 
associate’s degrees. They continue to offer bachelor’s, 
master’s, and doctoral degrees. There are distinct faculties 
with distinct promotion and tenure requirements. 
On the other hand, non-academic units have been merged. 
The combined GSU has one Registrar’s Office and one 
Office of Safety and Security (a.k.a. campus police). This 
organizational model is employed by a number of other 
institutions. For example, Emory University’s Oxford College 
is a distinct college within Emory University that offers the 
first two years of the Emory curriculum. 
BENEFITS OF THE PLANNED ORGANIZATIONAL
MODEL 
Why retain Perimeter College as a distinct college within 
Georgia State University? First, GSU and GPC had distinct 
admission requirements. In particular, GPC enrolled a large 
group of students in its remedial education (“learning 
support”) program. Diversity within the classroom is certainly 
a good thing. However, when it comes to students’ level 
of academic preparedness, too much diversity within one 
classroom can create practical challenges and obstacles for 
effective teaching and student success. To the extent that 
this is a legitimate worry, avoiding the integration of the 
associate and bachelor students has some benefit. Second, 
this system allows distinct promotion and tenure criteria. 
GPC did not have a research mission, so its faculty were 
not hired with research in mind. Moving GPC faculty into 
departments with a research mission would cause problems 
for the GPC faculty and for preexisting GSU faculty. Third, 
with Perimeter as a distinct college, it is easier to do apples-
to-apples comparisons (e.g., about student performance) 
pre- and post-consolidation. Fourth, it is administratively 
simpler to retain Perimeter College as a distinct college. 
Fifth, this option offers a number of financial benefits and 
helps to mitigate a number of financial risks that mergers 
sometimes encounter.
Importantly, keeping Perimeter College a separate college 
enables the possibility to keep its tuition rates lower, a 
significant financial benefit to students. This is important 
if enrollment numbers at Perimeter College are to be 
maintained. An organizational plan which fully integrated 
the GPC faculty and students into the preexisting GSU 
colleges would be under a great deal of pressure to raise 
the tuition levels from the lower level that is the norm for 
associate institutions to the higher level that is the norm at 
the state’s research universities. Obviously, raising tuition 
could have a serious negative impact on enrollments. 
Similarly, keeping Perimeter College a separate college 
makes it possible to keep payroll costs for faculty (one of 
the largest portions of any university’s operating budget) 
from increasing as a result of the consolidation. The pre­
consolidation GSU faculty had higher salaries than the 
faculty at GPC. An organizational plan which fully integrated 
the GPC faculty into departments within GSU’s colleges 
would be under a great deal of pressure to take steps 
toward equalizing faculty pay. Such a plan would increase 
the payroll costs of the resulting institution, which would 
make tuition increases unavoidable. However, again, 
increasing tuition rates would jeopardize enrollment.1 
ADDITIONAL RISKS 
Some at Georgia State worry that having “Georgia State 
University” on two-year college degrees will hurt Georgia 
State’s reputation. It is hard to estimate the seriousness of 
this risk because there have been so few cases of this sort of 
consolidation. We tend to hold the view that a well-managed 
consolidation can minimize this risk. Emory University’s 
Oxford College shows that it is possible to have a two-
year program inside a research institution with no negative 
impact on academic reputation. Additionally, as the Emory 
University example shows, there is a potential benefit for 
associate’s degree programs. For better or worse, there is, 
in the minds of some students, a stigma associated with 
attending a two-year college. Insofar as there is this stigma, 
it may have dissuaded potential students from enrolling at 
GPC. It may be that the “Georgia State University” name will 
help to minimize this concern. Potentially, this may make 
enrolling in an associate’s degree program more attractive 
to students who would otherwise have looked elsewhere 
for their education or not have gone to college at all. 
Accordingly, there is a potential benefit to students that 
may result simply from the rebranding. 
Another worry is that GSU is taking on GPC’s financial 
problems. From 2009 to 2015, Georgia State’s enrollment 
grew from about 30,000 students to about 32,000 students, 
while GPC’s enrollment fell from about 25,000 to about 
21,000. Possible explanations for this drop include the 
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reviving economy and a change in the System’s remedial 
education rules. (Most colleges and universities in the 
System have had enrollments fall during this period—GSU’s 
success during this period is something of an outlier.) 
Although there will be cost savings from combining non­
academic units, it will be vital to return Perimeter College 
to a path of growing enrollments. 
Any time two organizations merge, there is a risk of culture-
clash. We need to be honest. This is not a consolidation of 
equals. The combined institution retains the Georgia State 
University name and the Georgia State University president. 
None of the senior administration at Georgia State lost their 
jobs because of this consolidation. Some members of the 
senior administration at Georgia Perimeter College have 
lost their jobs, and others have had reduced job titles. In 
the consolidation of policies and procedures, the decision 
was made that the default policy would be Georgia State’s. 
GPC faculty and staff will have to adapt to a new culture 
that largely represents the existing culture at GSU. 
One worry on the part of Perimeter College faculty is 
connected with this. Many worry that the consolidation 
will have a harmful impact on student learning. The culture 
at GSU is the culture of a research university—a culture in 
which large numbers of undergraduates at the freshmen 
and sophomore level are taught by graduate students 
with little classroom experience. The undergraduate 
bodies of GPC and GSU were similar in many ways. They 
were similar in their ethnic diversity and in their diversity 
along socio-economic lines. Indeed, a substantial portion 
of GSU’s upperclassmen were originally GPC students 
who transferred after completing some coursework or an 
associate’s degree at GPC. However, the GPC students who 
successfully transfer to GSU represented only a portion 
of GPC’s student body. GPC’s student body included a 
significant number of students that are weaker in terms 
of their academic preparedness. Thus the student body at 
GPC contained a significant portion of students who were 
much weaker than the students GSU faculty would typically 
encounter. Perimeter faculty thus worry that a general 
policy of adopting the ways of GSU whenever the cultures 
and practices of the two institutions differ will result in a 
consolidated institution that is no longer well suited to the 
needs of its most at-risk students. 
While this last worry is felt acutely by some faculty at 
Perimeter College, neither of the present authors see the 
need to be particularly pessimistic on this issue. The effort 
at consolidation is being made with some care to retain 
what is successful and necessary for student success when 
the practices of the two institutions are in conflict. Much 
of what went on in the classroom at GPC will not change. 
Additionally, GSU’s current administration has shown itself 
to be attentive to the concrete results of the changes it 
makes, and we have reasonable confidence that if changes 
necessitated by the consolidation have a negative impact 
on learning-support students, corrective action can be 
taken once the institution has achieved a more stabilized 
(post-consolidation) state. Finally, because of the way state 
financing of higher education is structured, the consolidated 
institution has a large financial incentive to make sure that 
students at the associate level are successful. 
Another worry is triggered by the fact that Georgia Perimeter 
College recently went through a sudden leadership change 
and at least two rounds of budget cuts that resulted in 
layoffs. The consolidation has led to reductions in levels 
of non-academic staff. There is a risk that Perimeter faculty 
and staff will become demoralized. On the other hand, 
GSU’s leadership is stable, and because it has bucked the 
state-wide trend of declining enrollments, GSU has largely 
succeeded in avoiding budget cuts. It may be that the 
consolidation will bring more stability and minimize the 
risk of further enrollment declines and the budget cuts that 
they often cause. 
Finally, there are operational risks. The process of 
consolidation is extremely complex. There is, for example, 
a risk that the financial aid or accounts payable system will 
crash. We are in no position to evaluate this risk, but we are 
encouraged that this consolidation is not the System’s first 
and that the previous consolidations have largely avoided 
operational breakdowns. 
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS 
At a basic level, the combining of back-office and upper-
level administrative functions (deans, administrators, etc.) 
is likely to lower costs per student. This is one central 
reason that the System is pursuing consolidation. 
Students who go to two-year colleges and want to transfer 
to earn their bachelor’s degree often perceive the move 
from the two-year college to the four-year college as a 
barrier. The consolidation of GSU and GPC should make it 
easier for students to make this transition. The consolidated 
institution will have clear financial incentives to remove 
bureaucratic barriers between the two-year and the four-
year degree. In the ideal case, it will be as easy for a student 
who earns the associate’s degree to move to a bachelor’s 
program as it is for a student who earns a B in Calculus I to 
take Calculus II. 
There are cases in which the two institutions can profit from 
each other’s expertise. Over the past fifteen years, GSU has 
increased graduation rates dramatically (by approximately 
20 percentage points) and eliminated the gap between 
the graduation rates of white students and students from 
underrepresented minorities. Many of the lessons Georgia 
State has learned will help Perimeter College students 
graduate. GPC had (in our view) the best online program in 
Georgia. GSU faculty can learn a lot about online teaching 
from the Perimeter faculty. 
Georgia Perimeter College did not a have strong system 
of shared governance while Georgia State does. Perimeter 
College’s faculty and staff now have proportionate 
representation in GSU’s university senate structure. Indeed, 
Perimeter College’s faculty are one of the largest voting 
blocs. This gives Perimeter College faculty the opportunity 
to advance proposals through the normal process to 
redress or correct any perceived missteps made during 
the consolidation. Being empowered to work toward 
possible correction of any perceived mistakes should help 
mitigate any demoralizing effect on faculty. Although the 
consolidated Senate has only been in operation since 
January, we believe that Perimeter students and faculty 
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are already seeing the benefits of being a part of GSU’s 
stronger shared governance system. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: CONSOLIDATION AND
THE NEED FOR ACCESS TO QUALITY HIGHER
EDUCATION 
A healthy democracy depends on having an educated 
citizenry that can participate in decision-making. It depends 
on having a citizenry of critical thinkers who can focus on 
the common good, and who can resist the siren’s call of 
demagogues. When it comes to their access to quality 
higher education, the citizens need all the help they can 
get. They face many difficulties. The state of Georgia (like 
many other states) projects a great increase in the need 
for a college-educated workforce. While there seems to 
be the political will to mandate an increase in graduates, 
there does not seem to be the political will to increase 
state revenues so that colleges and universities receive 
adequate support. Instead, the state provides much less 
funding per student than it did in decades past. Costs are 
passed on to the students and their families in the form of 
increased tuition rates. This trend (the gradual privatization 
of the public education system) has been repeated across 
the country. The result of this trend has been a great 
increase in student debt—a troubling phenomenon that is 
currently receiving a good deal of attention in the media as 
we approach a national presidential election. 
The consolidation we have been considering (like the 
consolidation strategy generally) is obviously not a magic 
bullet that will solve these problems. However, in such 
times, every little thing that can be done to help should be 
done. We believe that this consolidation has the potential 
to increase the availability of quality education to the 
people of Georgia. 
Serving a total enrollment of roughly 52,000 students, the 
new institution created by this consolidation is the largest 
university in Georgia, and one of the largest in the country. It 
is only natural that a consolidation of this magnitude should 
face its fair share of obstacles and challenges. However, 
it seems to us that, all things considered, there is reason 
to be optimistic about the prospects for increased access, 
improved student outcomes, and overall cost-reduction. 
There is good reason to think that this consolidation will 
help more Georgians get a better education. 
ENDNOTES 
1.	 A recent planned consolidation in the state of Massachusetts 
had to be scuttled because of just such considerations. See 
Kellie Woodhouse, “Anatomy of a Failed Merger,” Inside 
Higher Ed, August 5, 2015, https://www.insidehighered.com/ 
news/2015/08/05/college-merger-negotiations-are-long-and­
complicated 
The Ethics of Freedom: A Unified 
Framework for Teaching Ethics in the 
Community College 
Michael B. Brezinsky 
DELGADO COMMUNITY COLLEGE
Time was when the good were the virtuous, then the stoic, 
the godly, the self-interested, the happy, the dutiful, and, 
more recently, the ones who show they care.1 Each ethical 
tradition asserts its own value-equation, (i.e., good = ‘x’), 
purported universal, and to ground its respective principle. 
However, where honesty outranks bias, ethics teachers 
understand that no single theory settles all dilemmas. This 
limitation leads to creative strategies that either stretch a 
principle beyond its scope, invoke whichever theory seems 
most apt to the dilemma, or suggest some, typically labored, 
patchwork of principles.2 The result for ethics students, 
and attendees of community colleges in particular, may be 
aversion more than moral erudition. Teachers need a way 
of framing the discipline such that contemporary students 
feel the personal importance of its question. 
Socrates understood his mission to help the people to 
find virtue. Ethics was not to be the exclusive property of 
philosophers. Yet, one need only to consider the current 
state of our communities to realize, either, that Ethics has 
become too diversified or esoteric to be popularly viable, 
or we teachers have failed to convey the real value of 
the good. Certainly, some will suggest that the simplest 
explanation is rampant and depraved akrasia. This last 
account suggests that people do what they want in place 
of what they know to be the good. This essay proposes a 
strategy for teaching ethics in a way that shows the good 
to be exactly what one wants. The two-year college setting, 
more than others, is a unique, but fleeting, opportunity 
to touch the minds of many. As a preponderance of our 
students move directly to the workforce, the ethics course 
may be one’s only formal academic exposure to the realm 
of character development. Where the college builds a 
workforce yet neglects to form the person, it has failed 
both community and student. Likewise, where philosophy 
is but debate among professional academics and no longer 
strives to awaken the people, it has failed its original 
vocation. 
The discipline of ethics seeks the meaning of a good 
life, but “goodness” can mean various things. To most 
students, “a good life” and “the good life” denote two 
very different notions. Socrates rejected this distinction. 
Properly understood, for him, a good life is its own reward. 
If Socrates is correct (and this writer thinks he is), no one 
who knows better would do wrong.3 Consequently, if we 
reject the convenient excuse that humanity is morally weak, 
it becomes incumbent on the teacher to demonstrate that 
goodness constitutes the best of all possible lives. Teaching 
ethics students in two-year colleges can only be effective if 
they are convinced that the good is in their interest. 
What has been said suggests a dual pedagogical challenge,
both practical and theoretical. The Socratic Paradox proposes
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that epidemic turpitude cannot be explained by moral
weakness. All people want the best lives for themselves. The
difficulty is more properly intellectual, a failure to understand
that the good do benefit. The latter challenge is the need,
more urgent now than ever, for a unified and simple moral
theory. Addressing the latter might make progress toward
the former, and enkindle new concern for being good. 
What follows is an attempt at a unified framework, not a 
compilation of extant traditions, but one that delivers a 
single, appealing principle, to capture what is said by all the 
rest. Thus we suggest from the start that students should 
understand every ethical tradition to identify something of 
real value to human beings. Each represents an aspect of 
the good. But the ethics course should not be presented as 
the search for a “correct” ethical theory. Rather, the learning 
outcome for the student of ethics must be genuine concern 
for how one ought to live. 
In the attempt of the traditions to assert the universality of 
their principles, each identifies a single moral standard, the 
parameters of which define a narrowness of scope. Whether 
this standard is the virtue of the mean, the fundamental 
goods of natural law, the sating of self-interest via contract, 
happiness, the good will, the Overman, or Care, the 
ground of every value is the same. That which makes all 
valuation possible is the freedom of autonomous beings. 
Throughout the current essay, “autonomy” means potential
self-direction, while “freedom” means the power to enact 
it. Thus all free beings are autonomous; however, not all 
the autonomous are free. We seek to demonstrate that 
the fundamental value of each aforementioned standard 
is freedom as an end-in-itself. The end of human freedom 
is the freedom of the human. Because beginning college 
students are especially enamored with the excitement of 
a sudden liberty, the idea that moral goodness is in the 
interest of their freedom cannot fail to be of appeal. 
On our theory, freedom is not only the condition of 
all value, but itself is understood as summum bonum. 
Wherever individuals find meaning in their lives, maturity 
understands that one is individually responsible for what 
ultimately becomes of oneself. To be free is to assume this 
obligation. We thus propose “the principle of freedom”: 
One ought always to seek the preservation of freedom, 
both in thought and action, in others, and also in oneself. 
This principle is grounded in the assertion that the essence 
of human existence is autonomy; becoming free is the 
improvement of the soul. Action that tends toward the 
destruction of freedom is prohibited; action that tends 
toward its preservation is promoted. 
Freedom, however, does not mean immunity from just 
incarceration.4 Citizenship implies agreement to live 
according to the law. One who willfully violates such law 
breaches it freely. To impose the statutory punishment 
for a freely chosen act is not the denial of one’s freedom; 
contrarily, justice is, in fact, its affirmation.5 Should law 
be enacted without a moral ground, this may justify civil 
disobedience and the will to suffer freely for one’s cause. 
Nor does freedom mean doing whatever one may wish. 
To seek the freedom of autonomous beings implies 
avoidance of such action as would result in its destruction. 
For example, should one wish regularly to abuse habit-
forming drugs, the consequence whereof is addiction, 
deprivation of one’s freedom will ensue. Active addiction is 
a loss of self-control and any chance of not succumbing to 
obsession. Thus drug abuse is a violation of the principle 
of freedom. 
Each of the following sections will begin with a brief 
synopsis of a particular ethical tradition as might be taught 
in an introductory course. These are meant only to capture 
the basic teaching in each case and presumably remain 
uncontroversial. As opposed to developing an extended 
interpretation of any ethic, each is treated only so far as 
is necessary to demonstrate that it can be understood as 
seeking the end of human freedom. When the tradition is 
framed in this way, the respective moral theories seem less 
purely academic, and become strategies for enhancing 
students’ lives. 
FREEDOM AND VIRTUE 
For Aristotle, human beings are rational and social animals. 
Each component of this conception reveals an aspect of 
his thought. Because happiness, understood as well-being 
and flourishing, is conceived an intrinsic good, Aristotle 
deems it a rational end. Our sociability serves to instruct 
our imitation, while the necessity of virtue arises from 
animality. People are afflicted by the vicious extremes of 
deficient and excessive emotional response. Thus virtue is 
a mean that lies between these two extremes. For example, 
all animals experience fear. Yet, in humanity, the remedy 
is courage. The excessive are the reckless, the deficient, 
cowardly. 
The sole point of this synopsis is to suggest that the value 
of the virtues lies in preserving our freedom. The extremes 
result in one’s captivity. Want of real courage is enslavement 
to one’s fear, either through cowardice or temerity. When 
seized by base emotion, virtue frees us from its conquest 
and the onus of self-deprecating thought. Virtue as a mean, 
itself, is an extreme for one must freely choose to face off 
with one’s vice. Recklessness exposes one to injury or 
death, while cowardice is a prison of its own. Well-being is 
the freedom from diverse forms of oppression; flourishing 
is freedom from decline. For the contemporary student, 
“virtue” sounds anachronistic, but freedom is a timeless 
incentive. 
FREEDOM AND STOICISM 
Central to the counsel of Epictetus stand two profoundly 
wise directives. The first instructs that one ought always to 
distinguish between that which is within one’s control (is 
one’s own) from that which is not (belongs to others). The 
second instructs one, in every situation, to remember the 
general nature of things. 
The first principle makes our point explicit. Things within 
one’s control are free, unrestrained, and unhindered; things 
not in one’s control are weak, slavish, and restrained. The 
aim is freedom from disturbance of various sorts, e.g., 
blame, accusation, fear, coercion, harm, loss, and the 
pangs of guilty conscience. 
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To mistake that which lies beyond one’s control for that 
which lies within is to enslave oneself to a life of winless 
battles and a false sense of incompetence. Perhaps the 
gravest error of this sort is attachment to the past. Of 
course, most people do not actually believe they can 
alter the bygone. Still, regretting and bemoaning what 
is done or left neglected is a failure to heed this basic 
truth. Ensnarement in the past comes at the cost of a free 
present. Alternatively, learning from the past can obviate 
the foolishness of committing all the same mistakes again. 
The second principle instructs us to remember the general 
nature of things, i.e., to understand their essence. Yet 
Epictetus’ illustration seems not to do justice to the true 
depth of his very own advice. He writes, 
With regard to whatever objects give you delight, 
are useful, or are deeply loved, remember to tell 
yourself of what general nature they are, beginning 
from the most insignificant things. If, for example, 
you are fond of a specific ceramic cup, remind 
yourself that it is only ceramic cups in general of 
which you are fond. Then, if it breaks, you will not 
be disturbed.6 
Epictetus’ justification here for remembering the general 
nature of the ceramic cup seems to be essentially Platonic. 
The absolute cup (the Form) has not been lost, but only 
a reflection thereof. In any event, there are other ceramic 
cups. However, the deeper meaning of his teaching seems 
closer to the notion of being “already broken” articulated 
by Master Achaan Chaa. Understanding from the start 
that the nature of things is impermanence frees one from 
idolatry to objects. The cup is, in a sense, “already broken.” 
Not only does this ease excessive grieving at their loss 
as well as suffering the fear thereof, but knowing that 
possession is finite and contingent grants one greater 
appreciation for things not guaranteed at all. Moreover, 
infinitely greater is this insight when approaching love for 
persons. Belonging to the essence of persons is mortality. 
Genuinely understanding this can move the bereaved from 
the depths of great despair to celebration of having shared 
another’s life. All people value freedom from disturbance. 
FREEDOM AND NATURAL LAW 
One great advantage, especially today, of Natural Law 
over other faith-based ethics is that one need not have 
faith to affirm its teleological analysis. Aquinas asserts 
that all things in nature exist to serve a purpose, e.g., 
the eye is inclined toward vision, as the wings of a dove 
are inclined toward flight. His key move is to establish a 
parallelism between the inclinations of natural things and 
those of human beings. According to Aquinas, all persons 
have four basic inclinations, each of which indicates a 
fundamental good. Our desire to understand things exists 
for the sake of knowledge; our social nature exists for 
sociability; our inclination to preserve our lives exists for 
life itself; our sexual inclination exists to procreate. Thus 
one ought to promote the fundamental goods indicated 
by the human inclinations. To divert the inclinations from 
their fundamental goods is a violation of their natural 
purpose. Yet if, as we assert, the strength of Natural Law 
is teleological, wherein lies the final value of its goods?7 
Natural Law asserts the fundamental goods of knowledge, 
sociability, life, and procreation. We contend, however, 
that their value is not fundamental, but in the service of 
promoting human freedom. 
The promulgation of knowledge makes possible the 
freedom of informed decision-making. A corollary of the 
good of knowledge is the prohibition of telling lies. The 
object of knowledge is the true, and lies assert the false. 
Thus, telling lies violates the principle of freedom as it 
undermines one’s freedom to knowingly decide. Truth is a 
condition of living freely.8 
While the discussion of Contract Theory is reserved for 
the next section, Hobbes’ State-of-Nature is a powerful 
description of life devoid of sociability. War of every person 
against every other person is imprisonment in wretched 
solitude. Social life redeems us from the risk of isolation, 
total self-reliance, paranoia, lonesomeness, and insanity. 
Life outside society makes most every act purposive, 
seeking shelter, food, and all the means to live. Sociability 
brings leisure, the community, and friendship that liberate 
from strict utility.9 
The good of life is not found only in its preservation. To 
value life includes both the promotion of one’s health and 
the beneficial faculties of body. Thus action detrimental to 
any bodily function is certainly proscribed by Natural Law. 
Yet bodily action is the outward expression of freedom; 
thus to compromise the body is to restrict free exercise. 
Finally, from the perspective of Natural Law, sexuality 
indicates that procreation is a fundamental good. But the 
simple propagation of the species lacks a meaning unless 
living-in-itself is justified. We maintain that freedom itself 
justifies existence and procreation births autonomy. 
Beyond providing children the necessities to live, the 
duty of a parent is to guide them to be free. To teach the 
young avoidance of that which would enslave them, and to 
cultivate what talents they may have, creates opportunity, 
the richness and rewards, which come from seizing 
possibilities. 
FREEDOM AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
Contract Ethics begins with the assertion of every person’s 
right to everything, including use of other people’s bodies. 
Yet, as unbridled self-interest cannot flourish in the state-
of-nature, people contract to lay down some of their rights. 
The sole incentive to abide by the terms of the contract 
is fear of almost certain punishment. While bound by 
the contract, complete satisfaction is unlikely, but all are 
considered better off than not. Thus, on this theory, people 
have the natural right to the complete exercise of freedom. 
However, because people tend not to recognize that 
imposition upon the freedom of others is, at the same time, 
imposition on their own, there arises need of moral artifice. 
Like the Ethics of Freedom, the Contract Theory has an 
aspect of the Golden Rule built into its structure. The 
contract represents the idea that the way one treats 
others is likely to impact how one is treated. However, our 
principle also recognizes that action that imposes upon the 
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freedom of others, ipso facto, brings curtailment of one’s 
own. To restrict another’s freedom not only invites like 
reprisals, but even if retaliation does not, in fact, result, one 
is nonetheless haunted by the fear thereof. Drawing the 
students’ attention to this fact brings immediate incentive 
for respecting others’ freedom. Thus, preservation of 
freedom, both in thought and action, in others, and also 
in oneself, immediately prohibits such behavior as would 
catalyze the fear of retribution in like kind. The principle of 
freedom obviates the social contract. There is no need of 
Hobbes’ Leviathan. 
FREEDOM AND UTILITY 
Utilitarianism finds its root in the work of David Hume, for 
whom reason is descriptive; only passion can prescribe. 
Happiness is conceived as the greatest of all goods, which, 
for Bentham, means pleasure and absence of pain. Thus 
arises Mill’s principle of utility: maximize happiness for all 
sentient creation. 
It is beyond the scope of this essay to treat the difficulties 
with this or any other moral theory. The Utilitarian is well 
aware of the dangers of deciding moral issues by hedonic 
calculus.10 Let us deal only with utility as freedom. 
What can “absence of pain” mean but freedom from 
discomfort? And is pleasure not liberation from the tepid 
average day? Even if pleasure is conceived as an end-in­
itself, freedom of variation is its condition. Assuming the 
attempt to predict utility is presumptuous and fraught 
with difficulty, happiness can only be enacted by oneself. 
What, then, is promoting happiness but non-interference 
with another person’s own pursuit thereof? And scarcely 
can happiness prevail in a circumstance where individual 
freedom does not. The principle of freedom promotes the 
liberty of persons to seek happiness however it is deemed. 
FREEDOM AND THE GOOD WILL 
Clearly, of the classical traditions, Kantianism bears the most 
obvious kinship to the Ethics of Freedom. For Kant, only 
the good will can be considered absolutely good without 
further qualification. The good will is that which proceeds 
from duty (as opposed to that which merely accords with 
it), where duty is the necessity of acting from respect 
for the moral law, i.e., the categorical imperative. If the 
categorical imperative is to apply with absolute universality 
and necessity, argues Kant, it must be grounded in the 
existence of that which itself possesses absolute worth: the 
dignity of rational beings. The inviolable worth of rational 
beings is grounded in the freedom of the will. Thus, the 
formula of the end-in-itself states: Treat all rational beings 
as ends-in-themselves, and never only as a means. 
All valuation is made possible by freedom, which, for Kant, 
is the causality of will. Thus, for Kant, persons are the basis 
for the moral law. Reason gives the law unto itself. Before 
interpreting the categorical imperative in terms of the 
principle of freedom, a note on terminology is indicated. 
For Kant, the will is always free, but can vacillate between 
autonomy and heteronomy. The autonomous will proceeds 
from its own rational principle, while the heteronomous 
will proceeds from inclination. In the Ethics of Freedom, 
however, autonomy is potential self-direction. Thus the will 
is always autonomous, but can succeed or fail to be free, 
i.e., to think or act without hindrance or restraint. On our 
theory, the absence of freedom is equivalent to Kantian 
heteronomy. 
Now, as the categorical imperative commands respect 
for the freedom of rational beings (dignity), it follows that 
freedom is its own end. This is precisely our contention. For 
Kant, the heteronomous will is commanded by alien causes 
(inclinations), and, as such, is practically an object. For, the 
behavior of objects is strictly determined from without. 
Likewise, on our theory, infringement upon freedom is to 
treat both self and other as but things. 
FREEDOM AND CARE 
The Ethics of Care is a twentieth-century development,11 
arising from the historical neglect of the feminine 
perspective. It suggests that men and women think of 
goodness differently and articulates a more feminine 
voice. Whether this difference is grounded biologically, 
psychologically, sociologically, or otherwise, it is expressed 
as a shift away from universal, impartial moral principles 
(masculine) to particular and partial ethical commitments 
that arise strictly from personal relations (feminine). To 
be good is to respond to the perceived needs of others 
with whom one has entered a relationship. This principle 
is based on the conception of human nature as both 
feeling and relational. The theory admits of degrees of care 
proportionate to the nature of each relationship. Perhaps 
its most notable break with tradition is the insistence 
on moral partiality. Ethical commitments are bound to a 
network of specific beings with whom one has entered a 
relationship of caring. Noddings defines this relationship 
as existing between “one-caring” and “one cared-for.” The 
moral obligation of the one-caring is to respond to the 
needs of specific other beings. That of the one cared-for 
is acknowledgment of this care. Like Utilitarianism, Care 
Ethics includes animals in the sphere of morally relevant 
beings. 
The Ethics of Care might be regarded as a form of Virtue 
Ethics, focused specifically on those virtues in the interest 
of another, e.g., loyalty, empathy, charity, and patience. 
Whether or not caring for others is essentially more 
feminine than masculine, it is presumably the case that 
caring for those with whom one has relations does belong 
to the common-sense notion of goodness. 
To care for others frees one from exclusive self-interest. 
Likewise, to be cared-for liberates from deprivation. For 
those dependent upon others for their vital goods, the 
freedom to live at all depends on care. The Ethics of Care 
recognizes that each of us will, at some time, stand in 
need of being cared-for by another. Furthermore, on this 
theory, ethics arises from feelings of love and joy. Action 
taken in the name of love and joy may be the purest way 
to exercise one’s freedom. Contrarily, action motivated by 
purposiveness alone, rather than the springs of love and 
joy, is always but a means unto an end and, thus, remains 
a form of servitude. The value of care is grounded in the 
freedom of one-caring, and that of the one whom is cared-
for. 
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FREEDOM AND EXISTENTIALISM 
Existentialism begins with the daring Kierkegaard, who 
professes subjectivity as inescapable. When reason 
encounters metaphysical uncertainty,12 it is poised to make 
a leap of faith. Yet what matters most is not the direction 
of this leap, but the passion with which one makes the 
decision. The essence of existence is but the one we freely 
choose, and the choosing is more important than the 
chosen. 
For Kierkegaard, from the objective perspective, 
knowledge proper is compelled. Valid argument 
requires that affirmation of one’s premises necessitates 
affirmation of the conclusion. Science leaves no room for 
human freedom. Only from the perspective of subjective 
uncertainty is genuinely free decision possible. Infinite 
concern demands the passion of free choice. 
As Nietzsche affirms the metaphysic of the will-to-power, 
his thought may lie outside of this tradition. Yet, as will-to­
power commands self-overcoming as creation, the essence 
of his thought is existential. Master Morality is spontaneous 
self-affirmation and freedom from pity, hatred, and self-
loathing. The Slave revolt begins in the resentment of the 
other, impoverishment, self-pity, and negation. The master 
instinctively equates goodness with the feeling of strength 
and power as complete freedom to actuate the will. The 
slaves are self-imprisoned by their rancor towards the 
master; their values are established through oppression. 
Sartre’s formulation states that existence precedes essence. 
One must forge a meaning for oneself. Fashioning oneself 
requires action, as one is only that which one has done. 
Further, in choosing for oneself, one is responsible to 
all, as humanity is formed by every action. Being utterly 
responsible for what becomes of us is the basis for the 
rendering of judgment. For Sartre, moral judgment made 
of others is determined by whether choice is made in truth 
or self-deception. Lying to oneself about one’s possibilities 
shackles one to mediocrity. Judgment of the self is 
determined by whether or not one’s decisions are made 
in the name of freedom. Existentialism generates an ethic 
of commitment to activity and constant self-surpassing. 
Thus, freedom ought not have any end beyond itself as the 
meaning of ongoing self-creation. 
THE ETHICS OF FREEDOM 
The preceding exposition is intended to demonstrate that 
the extant moral theories can all be understood as seeking 
the value of our freedom. Freedom is both fulfillment of 
our essence (autonomy) and the condition of all moral 
valuation. The Ethics of Virtue, Stoicism, Natural Law, the 
Social Contract, Utility, Deontology, Care, and Existentialism 
each identifies its own ethical standard, depending on its 
view of human nature. Of course, the ethics teacher must 
present every theory of the good with loyalty to the tradition. 
Each system must be represented honestly and according 
to its own distinctive terms. Yet, the ability to demonstrate 
each theory as a corridor to freedom is certainly a boon. 
Howsoever the essence of humanity is read, its necessary 
ground is human freedom. Autonomous being is potential 
self-direction, but the freedom to enact it is a choice. 
Freedom is the final end of autonomous action; to preserve 
it is our primary duty. To subjugate our freedom to any 
value but itself immediately brings subservience. The end 
of human freedom must be freedom in itself, as goodness 
means fulfillment of our essence. Still, from the perspective 
of the two-year college student, this notion still remains 
too esoteric. However, in a world where freedom stands 
in constant jeopardy, liberty is of primary interest. Thus 
the principle of freedom both incentivizes goodness and 
guides the lives of students toward fulfillment. 
NOTES 
1.	 These references are not intended as exhaustive, but an 
introductory representation of the major traditions. The literature 
will be reviewed more widely in the development of this essay. 
2.	 Consider Rachels’ “Multiple Strategies Utilitarianism,” which 
prescribes living according to “one’s best plan” (p. 183). 
3.	 By “knowing better” is intended not a mere belief or even a 
reasoned principle pertaining to the good. To know the good 
entails a thorough understanding of the self-imposed physical 
and psychological consequences of immoral action. 
4.	 Justice is that which is merited by free action, whether this is 
reward or punishment. Just legislation protects the freedom of 
individuals. 
5.	 It is revealing that people seem not to be concerned when they 
avoid due punishment. However, deprive them of their just 
rewards and they immediately decry abuse of justice. Clearly, 
if their concern is one for justice itself, they will be equally 
outraged when not duly punished. In both cases, persons are 
treated as less than free. 
6.	 Epictetus, ¶3. 
7.	 From a philosophical point of view, the existence of God 
cannot be assumed. Thus, if the legitimacy of the Principle 
of Natural Law ultimately presupposes the existence of God 
as the Supreme moral authority, the theory requires proof of 
God’s existence. While Aquinas does develop various versions 
of the cosmological argument, we follow Kant in rejecting the 
attempt as lying beyond the possibility of human knowledge. 
Nonetheless, we maintain the theory to retain its teleological 
merit. 
8.	 C.f., Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. 
9.	 In the ordinary sense of task-oriented action. 
10. Classical Utilitarianism would seem to permit violations of 
the Pauline Principle as well as our common-sense intuitions 
regarding justice and basic human rights. A traditional response 
is to distinguish “act-utilitarianism” from “rule-utilitarianism.” 
Regardless, our discussion is not intended to address the pitfalls 
of this theory, but to argue that the value of utility is freedom. 
11. Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, Virginia Held, et al. 
12. Cf., Kant’s “dialectics of pure reason.” 
Making Connections: Philosophy as Self-
transformation and Critical Thinking 
Heather Wilburn 
MOBERLY AREA COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
A few years ago I came across a letter that a university 
professor wrote to his students at the beginning of the 
school year. It was a thoughtful and inspiring letter that 
outlined a range of details about the university experience, 
including tips for academic success and reminders about 
the need for students to enjoy their time during their 
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academic careers. Many of us that are teaching now 
remember our leisurely years of study. When I think back 
to my undergraduate years I recall relishing days at coffee 
shops poring over books and notes, and engaging in 
hours of conversations about art, literature, politics, and 
philosophy. I recognize now the freedom that I had to 
pursue whimsical adventures, to try out various hobbies, 
and to get to know not only others, many of whom have 
become lifelong friends, but also to get to know myself. Yet 
while I was reading this professor’s letter, it occurred to me 
that a great number of my students are juggling jobs and 
families with their own academic careers, and most of my 
students’ experiences during their academic years are far 
from leisurely. This reality has caused me to pause and to 
think about ways in which I can help students understand 
the benefits of studying philosophy. As philosophers, I 
realize that we could spend many hours (or pages) counting, 
categorizing, and prioritizing these benefits. Here I want 
to suggest that there are two types of benefits that non-
philosophy major students should be aware of. 
The first benefit of studying philosophy is that it is 
transformative. Philosophical activity can change the way 
you experience and think about the world. It fosters deep 
thinking that is substantial, allowing us to understand the 
world and ourselves in ways that go beyond the surface 
and the status quo. In fact, it compels us to question the 
status quo and to be critical of the way things appear to 
us by digging to sometimes veiled levels of understanding 
and truth. This is, in fact, what most philosophers mean by 
“thinking.” Yet at times it seems that we take it for granted 
that our students know that they should value philosophy— 
that this type of thinking is self-evidently valuable. However, 
if we recall our own early days with philosophy courses, 
most of us should see that thinking in a philosophical sense 
is a skill that we developed over time. Students should be 
made aware of the fact that philosophy involves a type 
of thinking that is likely new to them. This will help give 
them the confidence they will need to learn how to think 
critically and reflective and, hopefully, to come to value 
philosophy. The benefit of this type of thinking is that it 
drives us to seek truth and understanding, and it can give 
us access to profound angles in our lives. For example, 
philosophical thinking, which is critical and reflective, can 
aid in our interpersonal relationships with others, can help 
us wrap our minds around difficult topics such as death 
and religion, and can improve our ability to think and 
communicate clearly about issues that are important to us. 
This is what I think of as the sort of fundamental values of 
philosophy—the benefits of philosophy that we as teachers 
want our students to reap. 
The second benefit of studying philosophy is perhaps 
a more practical, or instrumental, benefit. In this sense, 
philosophy enables us to think critically and reflectively, 
to solve complex problems, to work collaboratively and to 
understand a wide range of perspectives, to analyze and 
synthesize, and to communicate in clear and assertive 
ways. I think of these benefits as practical because for 
students entering the job market for the first time or for 
those looking ahead for a career change, they will find that 
these are the very skills needed to land the jobs they seek. 
Additionally, these skills are crucial for students who are 
planning to move to four-year institutions and/or graduate 
school later in their academic careers. Both types of benefits 
are important and are worthwhile to our students. Again, 
however, I am afraid that sometimes we simply assume 
that the value of philosophy is self-evident. The problem 
is that most of our students have never taken a philosophy 
course, and many have no idea what our field is about. It is 
up to us to make these points clear and to connect with our 
students so they are inspired to study philosophy. 
Making connections with students is increasingly important 
today as many colleges are facing budget cuts and are 
trying to find the most effective ways to retain students. It 
is true that in the past retention efforts have been handled 
predominately by administrators—hired professionals that 
focus solely on student life, student services, and ensuring 
that our students return to classes each semester. However, 
if we only look at retention solutions from the administrative 
angle, we, as faculty members, are overlooking the role 
that we play in retaining students. One way to help retain 
students is to connect with them during the first meetings 
of our classes by sharing our philosophical journeys with 
them and explaining, in general terms, what philosophical 
activity entails and how precisely it will benefit them in 
various facets of their lives. 
When I enter the classroom this coming fall, my goal is to 
make explicitly clear the value of studying philosophy and 
developing critical thinking skills that will help students 
in the classroom and with their professional and personal 
lives. In the past few years I have developed a list of articles 
that I share with students that point out what students can 
do with a philosophy degree and pinpoint critical thinking 
skills that are valuable both inside and outside of the 
classroom.1 While these are great articles for students to 
access, it seems that I should make these points more 
explicit. Inspired by the professor’s letter to his university 
students, I will offer a letter to my philosophy students 
as a way to begin making these connections. I plan to 
deliver this letter to my students on the first day of class 
and then leave some time for my students to ask questions 
during our next meeting. I think it is worth the effort to 
connect with students from day one, and spending some 
time explaining exactly what our field is and why it should 
interest them is one way to accomplish this goal. I offer 
this draft only as an example of one way we might convey 
the importance of critical and reflective thinking and to 
demonstrate a sample of the benefits that our philosophy 
students might appreciate. I encourage you to fill in your 
own details, examples, and anecdotes as well as to use 
your own methods to foster students’ curiosity and invite 
them to engage in philosophical activities and courses. A 
draft of my letter follows: 
Dear philosophy students: 
When I think back to my first college classes, I 
remember my excitement for new beginnings and 
my curiosity for the various fields of knowledge 
and study that I did not even know existed before 
stepping foot on a college campus. In fact, it was 
this same curiosity that compelled me to return 
to philosophy classes semester after semester. 
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At the time, philosophy was mind-blowing to me; 
I had no idea that people had been asking such 
profound questions in a systematic way for the past 
2,500 years. My philosophy courses opened up an 
entirely new world for me and I never looked back. 
This, of course, is not to say that the questions that 
philosophers asked were all that different from 
some of the questions that I had asked myself at 
various points in my life. 
What does it mean to be a human being? 
Should morality dictate or influence societal 
laws? 
How do I know that my blue is the same blue 
as yours? 
What does justice mean? 
How should I treat others? 
How can I live the best possible version of 
myself? 
Are my actions freely chosen or is everything 
predetermined for me? 
Should Neo take the red pill or the blue pill? 
My philosophy classes not only asked the most 
intriguing and significant questions, but also 
revealed the way many important thinkers had 
answered such questions over the course of 
human history. I found that the answers developed 
by various thinkers often conflicted with one 
another. This was perplexing to me because I, 
like most students, was accustomed to having 
specific facts to memorize and to providing 
examples of various concepts to demonstrate the 
depth of my understanding regarding the subject 
matter of a given course. Philosophy, as Socrates 
demonstrates, is not about memorizing facts or 
classifying examples under various groups or 
concepts, but, rather, it is about reflective thinking 
and thorough examination of ideas and beliefs. In 
my philosophy classes I was developing ways in 
which to think deeply and clearly, to communicate, 
and to justify ideas and beliefs pertaining to 
knowledge, God, ethics, justice, and art. 
It was only years later that I realized that while 
the questions philosophers asked were certainly 
intriguing and important, it was really the 
philosophical method or the way that philosophical 
thinking unfolded that had the most significant 
impact on me. Philosophy is about the big 
questions and concepts that help us understand 
ourselves, the world we are immersed in, and 
our relationships to others. Learning how to think 
about and communicate such complex ideas is 
ultimately the foundation of every college mission 
statement that highlights critical thinking skills. 
In fact, education in the Western world, just like 
philosophy, has its roots in Ancient Greece. It 
was Plato who began the first higher education 
institution in the West when he opened the doors 
of the Academy, which is where many Greeks, 
including Aristotle, studied philosophy, politics, 
mathematics, medicine, and the sciences. 
Regardless of which field you are going into, 
your philosophy classes will be beneficial to 
you in the following ways: First, philosophical 
thinking is transformative and can alter the way 
one thinks, communicates, and acts. In this sense 
it can nourish our minds, shape our behaviors, 
and sometimes even effect change in the world. 
Second, philosophical thinking by its very nature 
is critical and reflective. Philosophical activity 
involves thinking about and communicating 
complex ideas, analyzing and synthesizing 
information, and being able to view problems 
from a wide range of perspectives. In this sense, 
philosophical activity can help you develop skills 
that your future professors and employers are 
looking for. I will expand on both of these types of 
benefits below, beginning with the transformative 
side of philosophy. 
In your philosophy classes your ideas and beliefs 
will very likely be challenged. This does not mean 
that you will be asked to abandon your beliefs, but 
it does mean that you might be asked to defend 
them. Additionally, your mind will probably be 
twisted and turned about, which can be an 
uncomfortable experience. Yet, if at all possible, 
you should cherish these experiences and 
allow them to help you grow as a thinker. To be 
challenged and perplexed is difficult; however, it 
is worthwhile because it compels deeper thinking 
and more significant levels of understanding. In 
turn, thinking itself can transform us not only in 
thought, but in our beliefs and our actions. Hannah 
Arendt, a social and political philosopher who came 
to the United States in exile during WWII, relates 
the transformative elements of philosophical 
thinking to Socrates. She writes: 
Socrates . . . who is commonly said to 
have believed in the teachability of virtue, 
seems to have held that talking and 
thinking about piety, justice, courage, and 
the rest were liable to make men more 
pious, more just, more courageous, even 
though they were not given definitions or 
“values” to direct their further conduct. 
Thinking and communication are transformative 
insofar as these activities have the potential to 
alter our perspectives and, thus, change our 
behavior. In fact, Arendt connects the ability to 
think critically and reflectively to morality. As she 
notes above, morality does not have to give a 
predetermined set of rules to affect our behavior. 
Instead, morality can also be related to the open 
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and sometimes perplexing conversations we have 
with others (and ourselves) about moral issues and 
moral character traits. Theodor W. Adorno, another 
philosopher who came to the United States in exile 
during WWII, argues that autonomous thinking 
(i.e., thinking for oneself) is crucial if we want 
to prevent the occurrence of another event like 
Auschwitz, a concentration camp where over one 
million individuals died during the Holocaust. To 
think autonomously entails reflective and critical 
thinking—a type of thinking rooted in philosophical 
activity and a type of thinking that questions and 
challenges social norms and the status quo. In this 
sense thinking is critical of what is, allowing us 
to think beyond what is and to think about what 
ought to be, or what ought not be. This is one 
of the transformative elements of philosophical 
activity and one that is useful in promoting justice 
and ethical living. 
The second type of benefit philosophy can offer 
may be a more immediate need for you as you 
prepare to enter the job market or to transfer to 
another school in order to continue your education. 
This type of benefit involves the development 
of certain skill sets that are deemed marketable 
and, thus, crucial for your future well-being. To 
be marketable in today’s job market, candidates 
need to stand out and to demonstrate that they 
bring something to the table that is needed by the 
employer that other candidates might not have. 
If you look at job advertisements, you will notice 
jobs from all fields require individuals who can 
work both independently and collaboratively, can 
discuss and solve complex problems, and have 
strong verbal and written communication skills. 
These skills are all related to what colleges refer to 
as critical thinking skills, and these are the type of 
skills that you will gain during your college career, 
particularly in your philosophy courses. 
For instance, in our philosophy course we will read, 
analyze, question, and discuss complex ideas 
and concepts. Because it is important to connect 
new ideas to experiences you have, we will apply 
these new ideas and concepts to events going 
on in the world. Often times you will make these 
kinds of connections to film and other art forms 
that you are familiar with. This is an excellent way 
to demonstrate the depth of your understanding 
and to make these ideas communicable to others. 
We will read, we will write, and we will discuss 
ideas and concepts that have driven generation 
after generation for the past 2,500 years. The point 
here will not be to find absolute answers, but to 
train ourselves to think deeply and with detail and 
focus, which is similar to the level of thinking that 
employers seek in new candidates. Sometimes 
we will need to examine and set aside our own 
assumptions and beliefs about the world in order 
to understand an issue or to solve a problem. 
Sometimes we will need to be able to look at an 
issue from a variety of different perspectives in 
order to see its nuances and complexities. This 
process—the philosophical life—will lead you to 
understand your own views and the views of others 
at a much deeper level. You will eventually be able 
to articulate and defend the views that you have or 
those that you develop and be able to talk about 
perspectives that you yourself may not agree with. 
With respect to the meaning of education, the 
German philosopher Hegel uses the term bildung, 
which means education or upbringing, to indicate 
the differences between the traditional type of 
education that focuses on facts and memorization, 
and education as transformative. Allen Wood 
explains how Hegel uses the term bildung: it is “a 
process of self-transformation and an acquisition 
of the power to grasp and articulate the reasons 
for what one believes or knows.” If we think back 
through all of our years of schooling, particularly 
those subject matters that involve the teacher 
passing on information that is to be memorized 
and repeated, most of us would be hard pressed to 
recall anything substantial. However, if the focus of 
education is on how to think and the development 
of skills include analyzing, synthesizing, and 
communicating ideas and problems, most of 
us will use those skills whether we are in the 
field of philosophy, politics, business, nursing, 
computer programming, or education. In this 
sense, philosophy can help you develop a strong 
foundational skill set that will be marketable for 
your individual paths. While philosophy is not the 
only subject that will foster these skills, its method 
is one that heavily focuses on the types of activities 
that will help you develop such skills. 
Overall, philosophical thinking will arm you with 
the skills needed to take the next steps toward 
your academic degree or your career. It is also this 
type of thinking that will enrich your souls, moving 
you to make the world a better place, driving your 
curiosity to tangle with new ideas and problems, 
and preparing you for meaningful relationships 
with others. I look forward to working with you and 
hope that your college experience is rewarding 
and enjoyable. 
NOTES 
1. Here are a few articles that I make available to my students: 
h t t p s : / / w w w. p s y c h o l o g y t o d a y. c o m / b l o g / e t h i c s ­
everyone/201605/ is -phi losophy-degree-useful?utm_ 
c o n t e n t = b u f f e r d c 6 a 8 & u t m _ m e d i u m = s o c i a l & u t m _  
source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/2004-02-11­
college-all-starts-cover_x.htm 
h t t p : / / w w w . n p r . o r g / t e m p l a t e s / s t o r y / s t o r y .  
php?storyId=93192093 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/education/06philosophy. 
html?_r=3& 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/work-in-progress/2012/03/27/ 
how-to-develop-5-critical-thinking-types/#727075378380 
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Preferred Qualifications: Community 
College Teaching Experience 
David Sackris 
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 
Given the extremely tight job market for professional 
philosophers, more Ph.D.s are beginning to consider jobs 
at the community college level.1 There are good reasons 
for considering this avenue: if you enjoy teaching, the 
job focus is on teaching, and your evaluation and tenure 
depend primarily on your performance in the classroom; 
if the prospect of working with a very diverse student 
body, both in terms of background and skill set, appeals 
to you; if the location in which you live is a large part of job 
satisfaction, there is a far greater ability to get a job in an 
urban area via the community college track. However, to 
get a job at a community college, one thing is prized above 
all: teaching experience. Yet this is where the newly minted 
graduate student may well be at a disadvantage in the 
community college hiring process. In this article I seek to 
address the issue of how to become a strong candidate for 
a community college position right out of graduate school. 
THE DILEMMA 
The teaching requirements of graduate students in Ph.D. 
programs vary greatly: some graduate students are thrust 
into the breach from practically the get-go and are assigned 
as the instructor of record to a class; at other institutions, 
students never move beyond running precepts or grading.2 
Additionally, the majority of faculty advisors would 
advise their students not to seek out additional teaching 
responsibilities—the smart thing to do, he or she would 
say, is to focus on course work or focus on completing 
one’s dissertation. A great majority of faculty advisors 
would probably tell a graduate student to be positively 
grateful if he or she is able to somehow avoid teaching 
responsibilities altogether. However, if one wishes to 
pursue a teaching-focused position, this may well be poor 
advice. 
The reason this may well be poor advice is that as advanced 
graduate students begin to examine community college 
job listings out of actual interest or sheer desperation, 
they will notice something rather disconcerting: they are 
not qualified for most full-time positions at community 
colleges. The reason these individuals are likely to be 
unqualified, despite their pending defense date and 
their forthcoming publication in Philosophical Quarterly, 
is that they don’t have sufficient teaching experience to 
be a serious contender for most positions. Although it is 
certainly true that community colleges now want their new 
hires to have Ph.D.s, what they really want is community 
college teaching experience. 
A brief perusal of jobs currently listed on a variety of 
job boards reveals the following: almost all community 
colleges require substantial teaching experience; almost 
all community colleges prefer community college 
teaching experience; almost all community colleges prefer 
candidates to have experience working with diverse student 
bodies; almost all community colleges prefer candidates 
who have experience teaching online; some community 
colleges require community college teaching experience; 
some community colleges require at least two or three 
years of full-time community college teaching experience 
for consideration.3 The harsh reality is this: unless you’ve 
taught at a community college for several years, you’re not 
going to be teaching full time at a community college.4 
TO BE, ONE MUST DO 
The fact is, teaching one course a semester, or serving as 
a mere teaching assistant for one course a semester, is not 
going to get you the experience needed to be competitive 
for a community college position. Even if you have taught 
multiple courses as the instructor of record at your graduate 
institution, this is not exactly the teaching experience that a 
community college hiring committee is looking for. At this 
point you may well think, “Teaching experience is teaching 
experience; what difference does it make if I have actually 
taught at a community college?” Answering this question 
is closely related to answering the question as to whether 
you should seriously consider pursuing a career at the 
community college level to begin with. 
In some sense, I agree with you: teaching at the college 
level is teaching at the college level—some of the skills 
will transfer to any institutional setting. But that’s just it: 
some of the skills. The community college is a unique 
learning environment, and your student population will 
differ greatly from the student population one experiences 
while teaching at their Ph.D.-granting program. Most Ph.D.­
granting programs in philosophy, whatever their perceived 
merit may be, are housed at flagship state universities 
or at premier private universities. As a result, experience 
teaching at your Ph.D.-granting institution only gives limited 
exposure to the college teaching environment: at any U 
of X the student population is predominantly of college 
age, and, since they are at a flagship state institution or 
private university, they are likely pretty good students 
who received a halfway decent high school education. It 
is true that there are a good number of students at the 
community college level who could have gone to a good 
state university right out of high school. But, ultimately, this 
is only a portion of the student population that exists at the 
community college level. 
According to the American Association of Community 
Colleges (AACC), the average age of community college 
students is 28.5 Undoubtedly, you will have students who 
are older than you. Additionally, student diversity at the 
community college level is astounding, both in terms of 
racial and ethnic diversity, and in terms of diversity of 
skill sets.6 These facts provide unique challenges in the 
classroom (e.g., how do I engage a room full of students 
with a diverse range of abilities?). Your students will also 
have a range of responsibilities that radically differ from 
the typical student at a four-year institution. Given that the 
median age is 28, many students at the community college 
level have families that they need to provide for and full-
time jobs. Almost every single student has a job of some 
form. That doesn’t necessarily mean that a community 
college instructor assigns less work or expects less from 
his students; it does mean that part of being a successful 
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community college instructor is having a good idea of what 
your answer is going to be when a student asks to make 
up an exam because he or she could not find adequate 
child care for that day. The only way to gain reasonable 
experience with such a diverse student body is by working 
with such a diverse student body. Also, the only way to 
determine if that kind of experience is worthwhile for you 
personally is by having that kind of experience. 
The following is a common saying at the community 
college level: there is no typical community college 
student. I agree with that to some extent, but, hopefully, 
as the above makes clear, if there is a feature that typifies 
community college students, it is that they have a lot of 
competing obligations—school cannot necessarily, nor 
perhaps should it be, their number one priority as we 
might expect of a traditional college student. As a result, 
community college interviewers are going to ask different 
kinds of questions. Here is a sample of community college 
interview questions: 
Part of a liberal arts education includes making sure 
that students are well-versed in an understanding 
of the many social, cultural, and economic 
influences that shape who they are. What does 
philosophy add to that understanding that isn’t 
already covered by the social sciences? 
Our students come to us with a wide range of 
academic preparedness and backgrounds. What 
strategies have you employed in your past teaching 
experience to encourage student success with a 
similar student body? 
A student comes to your office hours and tells you 
that she has been living out of her car. What do 
you do?7 
If you have not worked in a community college-like 
setting, it is going to be very hard to answer these kinds 
of questions.8 You may think that the third question is far-
fetched, but, in fact, I had a student come to my office to 
tell me that she had been evicted from her apartment in my 
first semester as a full-time community college instructor. 
Gaining experience at the community college level will 
prepare you to answer questions like these. If you cannot 
answer questions like these, you will not be able to secure 
a full-time position at a community college. 
You might further be tempted think, “Okay, I don’t have 
community college-specific teaching experience, but I 
do have some significant teaching experience—I held a 
visiting assistant professor position! So I will probably be 
a strong applicant even if I don’t meet all the preferred
qualifications that you mentioned above. I mean, I have a 
Ph.D.! You said that only some colleges require community 
college teaching experience. I have looked at a few job 
postings. For a good number of positions, the required 
qualifications merely state ‘master’s degree in philosophy 
and one year equivalent full-time college teaching 
experience.’ So I don’t need to do anything special—I can 
apply to community colleges as a back-up plan while I 
apply to four-year schools as well.” 
You shouldn’t be surprised to learn that it is pretty 
competitive out there for community college jobs. If you are 
not able to meet a majority (preferably all) of the preferred 
qualifications, you don’t have much of a chance. At many 
community colleges the applications are first culled 
through by individuals in the human resources department, 
or via an initial screening committee. The human resources 
department/screening committee will likely only give 10 
or 12 dossiers to the actual faculty search committee. And 
you can probably guess how they determine which files to 
pass along. Just in case you can’t, I’ll tell you: by checking 
off each of the required and preferred qualifications that 
you fulfill—the more you are able to fulfill, the better your 
chances.9 Further, when a college asks for the equivalent 
of one, two, or three years of full-time teaching experience, 
they mean full-time teaching at a single institution. 
Adjuncting at three different institutions so that you end 
up with a course load of five classes a semester will still 
only count as part-time work in the eyes of most human 
resources offices because of the way that faculty contracts 
are drawn up. Typically, each year of adjunct work counts 
as half a year of full-time work, regardless of how many 
classes you taught “part-time” during that year. So if you 
don’t have the preferred number of years of teaching 
experience at the right kind of institution, your application 
may not even be looked at by any faculty members on the 
hiring committee. 
This is good news and bad news. It is bad news if you have 
finished your degree, since to become competitive for a 
full time position at a community college you will need to 
adjunct for at least two years at the community college level. 
It is good news for those of you still in graduate school: 
teaching one community college class each semester gets 
you half a year of full-time teaching experience. If you do 
that for two years, you have the equivalent of one year of 
full-time teaching experience at the community college 
level! 
The upshot of this article should by now be clear: I am 
telling you that if you are at all interested in applying for 
full-time positions at the community college level as a 
newly minted Ph.D., you should be working part time at the 
community college level while you work to complete your 
degree. This advice may sound completely radical, but it 
is, in fact, completely practical.10 There are lots of reasons 
to avoid working outside your Ph.D.-granting institution 
even if you think you might be interested in teaching at the 
community college level: no time, your committee won’t 
want you to, it’s inconvenient, you’re a genius, you’re don’t 
want to contribute to the adjunctification of the American 
university system, you don’t like undergraduates, etc. I will 
address some of these concerns. 
CONCERNS ABOUT ADJUNCTING WHILE A
GRADUATE STUDENT 
I just can’t find the time: Teaching a new class for the 
first time is a time consuming affair, especially if you are 
concerned with doing a good job (which you should be). 
But (fortunately or unfortunately) teaching is the kind of 
thing you learn by doing. Almost all graduate students 
serve as TAs. If you don’t know where to start, just start 
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with one of your professors’ syllabi. It may (very well) be 
that the person you TA’ed for is not a great teacher. But 
you need to start somewhere. Most likely any faculty 
mentor will gladly provide you with syllabi, lecture notes, 
and even tests and assignments. Just as we can become 
virtuous by imitating others who know, we can become 
halfway decent teachers by imitating other teachers. After 
you use your mentor’s syllabus, you’ll figure out what 
works for you and what doesn’t, and modify it accordingly 
for the community college setting. Once you teach a class 
for the first time and work out the kinks, a 3-credit hour 
class should not take up any more than 10 hours of your 
time each week (once you really have things down, only 
6-7; remember that community college professors have 
5/5 loads plus committee responsibilities—if that sounds 
horrific, you should probably just stop reading now). Those 
10 hours include time devoted to grading. So if you’re 
teaching one class at the local community college, you 
could conceivably have a situation in which you teach one 
3-hour session a week, and then devote a few hours of 
your Saturday to grading and prep work. Part of being an 
academic is juggling multiple responsibilities, so this will 
constitute good practice. Bottom-line: if you are interesting 
in teaching full time at a community college, you should 
find the time to start adjuncting at one as a graduate 
student. 
My committee won’t want me to: Your committee also 
won’t want you to procrastinate or drink so much. But your 
committee doesn’t know about everything that you do, nor, 
if they did, would they approve of it. At the end of the day, 
it’s your life. If you might be interested in teaching at the 
community college level, it makes sense to figure out if 
you enjoy doing so as soon as is feasible in order to get 
the kind of experience you will need to be a competitive 
candidate on the job market (remember: two years of 
teaching experience at the community college level is 
required for some positions, which equals four years 
of adjuncting). My committee may have been less than 
thrilled that I included community colleges as part of my 
job search; however, I was confident in my decision to do 
so because I knew what I was getting myself into, thanks to 
my adjuncting experience. It’s also important to remember 
that your committee is likely not going to pay for you to 
have health insurance when you run out of department 
funding and don’t have a full-time job. 
It’s inconvenient to teach somewhere besides my home 
institution: If there aren’t many community colleges 
around you, it may well be rather inconvenient to teach 
at one while pursuing your degree. Adjuncting, if not in a 
major city, pretty much requires a car. And adjunct pay isn’t 
very good, if you haven’t heard. For some people, teaching 
only one section at the nearest community college may 
well be a break-even enterprise once one factors in car 
maintenance, insurance, and gas prices. Even if this is the 
case, the experience is invaluable. You will figure out if this 
is something that you want to pursue. You will gain valuable 
teaching experience no matter what path you ultimately 
pursue, and with today’s low gas prices, you will probably 
at least have some extra spending money to supplement 
your graduate stipend. If you are interested in pursuing a 
job at a two-year college, it is better to adjunct now while 
working to degree than have to support yourself entirely on 
adjunct wages after degree. If you are doing the latter, you 
will have no time for research, which you will need to be 
engaging in if you want to keep your career options open.11 
Teaching one class at your graduate institution and one 
class at an outside institution amounts to a 2/2 load with no 
committee responsibilities. If you cannot find time to work 
on your dissertation with that kind of responsibility, then 
you are not going to find time to write as a professional 
academic. 
I don’t want to contribute to the adjunctification of the 
American university: Yes, I agree that what is happening to 
higher education is completely deplorable. This article is 
essentially advice for operating within the corrupt system. 
I don’t have an answer to the adjunct crisis. As someone 
who adjuncted for many years, I firmly believe that the pay 
offered to the vast majority of adjuncts devalues their labor 
and their educational attainment. I am also not advocating 
adjuncting as a means to earning a full-time living. That 
is why I am advocating that one adjunct while a full-time 
graduate student with university support, i.e., when one is in 
a situation where one does not need to support themselves 
through only adjunct labor. The reason for adjuncting while 
a graduate student is to get the experience you need to 
compete for full-time, teaching-focused jobs as soon as 
the degree is in hand. At the end of the day, especially 
at the community college level, some use of adjuncts is 
necessary. Enrollments fluctuate, tenured professors go 
on sabbatical, schools are inadequately funded, voters are 
indifferent, etc. 
But “I’m the next Kant”: Then there is no reason for you 
to test the community college waters. Wait patiently for 
research universities to call you. 
THIS ARTICLE IS NOT MEANT TO IMPLY THAT
COMMUNITY COLLEGE TEACHING IS FOR
EVERYONE 
Community college teaching is not for everyone, and 
it is not something that every person should necessarily 
consider. If your main concern is with time for research, 
then you should not consider the community college 
track. If you consider teaching a toilsome side task, then 
you should not consider the community college track. If 
you can’t imagine teaching five classes a semester for 
the majority of your career, you should not pursue the 
community college track. If you don’t want to work with 
students who are under-prepared for college level work, 
then you should not pursue the community college track.12 
Much of the advice given by Rob Jenkins at the Chronicle of 
Higher Education is sound, and the following is particularly 
so: You cannot think of applying to community colleges as 
a “back up plan” in the sense that it is merely something 
you are willing to do, and not actually interested in nor 
willing to put in the work to become a credible candidate.13 
If you don’t genuinely enjoy teaching and genuinely enjoy 
working with community college students, you won’t get 
the job and you probably won’t even get an interview. 
Further, knowing what you are getting yourself into before 
embarking on a career path is a significant part of job 
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satisfaction.14 Therefore, if you are interested in applying 
for community college positions upon completing your 
degree as part of a larger search strategy focused on 
teaching institutions, the best way to write a meaningful 
cover letter that speaks to the concerns of the faculty 
search committee and truly expresses your interest in 
the position is by having actually worked with community 
college students. This is why I am advocating for getting 
the experience as a graduate student, if it is something you 
are willing to seriously consider. If you are someone who 
is genuinely really interested in teaching, teaching at the 
community college level could be extremely rewarding.15 
NOTES 
1.	 Jenkins anecdotally reports that more and more graduate 
students are expressing interest in community college teaching 
and that more and more community colleges are requiring the 
Ph.D. for employment. See Jenkins, “What Graduate Students 
Want to Know about Community Colleges, Part I,” Chronicle of 
Higher Education, last modified April 22, 2012, http://chronicle. 
com/article/What-Graduate-Students-Want-to/131600/. 
2.	 At my graduate program I was assigned my own class in my 
third semester; at Princeton, for example, graduate students are 
not typically assigned their own course within the philosophy 
department in the entire degree program. See https://philosophy. 
princeton.edu/graduate/standard-program. 
3.	 See current job postings at Ivy Tech Community College, 
College of Southern Nevada, CUNY Queensborough Community 
College, Community College of Philadelphia, and Santa Monica 
Community College. This is just a small sampling. See also Rob 
Jenkins, “Straight Talk about ‘Adjunctification’,” The Chronicle 
of Higher Education, December 15, 2014, http://chronicle.com/ 
article/Straight-Talk-About/150881 
4.	 The old Aristotelian paradox—how can we perform the 
courageous action if we are not courageous already? “For the 
things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by 
doing them. . . .” NE (1103a32). So, too, we become full-time 
community college professors by acting as indentured servants 
in an unjust system. 
5.	 See American Association of Community Colleges, “2015 
Fact Sheet,” http://www.aacc.nche.edu/AboutCC/Documents/ 
FactSheet2015.pdf 
6.	 See the 2015 Fact Sheet (ibid.) for the demographic break down 
of community college students. 
7.	 These samples have been collected by the author. To see a list of 
common (non-discipline specific) community college questions, 
see “Guidelines for Hiring Full Time Faculty Members at Austin 
Community College,” accessed November 5, 2015, http://www. 
austincc.edu/hr/hireguide/ftfaculty/sampleqs.html 
8.	 What do I mean by “community college-like” setting? There 
are institutions that serve student populations similar to the 
community college population: schools that make it their 
mission to serve first generation students, minority students, and 
students from poor and working-class backgrounds. However, 
these institutions are far less likely to have adult learners or 
the certificate programs that are typically offered at community 
colleges. Nonetheless, skills gained at these kinds of institutions 
can be used to bolster the case that one is a good fit for a 
community college. 
9.	 I am writing this based on my firsthand experience, but it is also 
supported by Tom Hurley. See Tom Hurley, “Hiring at Two-year 
Colleges,” Inside Higher Ed, 2010, https://www.insidehighered. 
com/advice/2010/01/15/hurley 
10. See also “Hiring at Two-year Colleges.” 
11.	 Research is possible in a full-time community college position 
if that is a goal. Many community college instructors make time 
for their own personal projects in part because they are far 
better off than adjuncts: 1) they are not driving to three different 
universities; 2) many teach some online sections, which frees up 
some time that would be spent in the classroom; 3) they get a 
paid summer vacation. 
12. Rob Jenkins makes these same points. See his	 “Community 
Colleges Might Not Be For You,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 
2015, http://chronicle.com/article/Community-Colleges-Might­
Not/233914. In fact, this section is in part inspired by his article.
13. See ibid. 
14. See John P. Murray and Sean Cunningham, “New Rural Community 
College Faculty Members and Job Satisfaction,” Community 
College Review 32, no. 2 (2004): 19–38. 
15.	 See “Community Colleges Might Not Be For You” for what it 
means to be “really” interested in teaching. 
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Community College Teachers and 
American Philosophical Association 
Meetings 
Andy Wible 
MUSKEGON COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
Should community college teachers attend the APA 
meetings? Even though, according to the American 
Academy of Community Colleges, over seven million people 
enroll each fall in two-year colleges, should the philosophy 
teachers of those students skip the annual national 
meetings? Should the APA want such participants, and is 
it doing enough to attract this part of the professorate? 
This paper will explore these questions and answer them 
in the affirmative. Community Ccollege teachers do have 
good reason to attend APA meetings, and the APA has 
good reason to focus on tthem. The paper will begin by 
exploring possible reasons community college instructors 
do not go to the divisional meetings. It will then set out 
several reasons community college instructors have for 
going to APA meetings. The final section will look at several 
actions the APA should take to attract such instructors to 
the divisional meetings. 
There are many reasons that community college instructors 
do not attend APA meetings, and many of these also apply 
to teachers from other smaller colleges. One reason often 
given by friends and colleagues is that they do not go to 
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APA meetings because the meetings are for researchers, 
not teachers. They are to promote research. The sessions 
are for faculty and graduate students to present their 
latest research and to mingle with other researchers. Many 
people who teach at two-year schools do so because they 
do not want to do research. The annual meetings simply 
are not for them. 
After all, community college teachers are just that: teachers. 
Their colleges do not evaluate them by the research that 
they do, and so few do it. Most have high teaching loads 
of five or six classes per semester without any teaching 
assistants to lessen the chore of grading. The result is 
often 150-plus students and hundreds of papers to grade 
each semester. When committee assignments are added, 
there is just very little time for research. And when two-year 
teachers go to APA meetings, they often say that it seems 
like graduate school again. They are back at a research 
institution where all the prestige and discussion is around 
the latest book written and the newest scholarly article 
published. The conference seems alien to their current 
situation and needs. It’s uncomfortable. 
A second reason colleagues have mentioned for not 
attending is money. There is very little money for 
professional development at community colleges. APA 
conferences are held at expensive hotels and in expensive 
cities. So, financially, it is difficult for many to attend. They 
may get some funding if they are on the program. But, again, 
it is intimidating to be on the program even as a program 
chair if you are not a researcher. There are sessions on 
teaching and community college instruction, but they are 
few. Community colleges often will pay only if the faculty 
member can show how attending the conference will 
improve their teaching, and since APA conferences don’t 
focus on teaching, this claim can be difficult to support. 
Some community college teachers do enjoy writing and 
research. Some teachers might have wanted research jobs 
at large research institutions, but due to a tight job market, 
family commitments, or other reasons, have ended up at 
a community college. Nonetheless, they often don’t go to 
APA meetings to present their papers. Coming from a less 
prestigious college can be intimidating. APA conferences 
are places where the best in the field might be responding 
to your paper, and audiences as a whole are known to 
be ruthless at times in tearing down underdeveloped 
arguments. This approach is in many ways inherent in 
the nature of philosophy. Philosophers point out poor 
arguments. Yet, other philosophy conferences do better 
nurturing new research ideas and interests. 
Finally, community college colleagues say that they 
don’t go to the APA meetings because they don’t think 
that the topics apply to them. There is a session on two-
year colleges or teaching that is usually late at night on 
a Friday, but the other sessions just are not applicable to 
their circumstances. A session on Kant’s 4th antinomy or on 
game theoretical approaches to meaning is just not likely 
to provide material for discussion in a 101 or basic logic 
class. So, such sessions might be fun, but don’t quite seem 
to be relevant to professional development. 
These reasons, and likely others, for not going to the APA 
meetings seem to convince most community college 
teachers not to attend APA conferences. Yet, are there 
countervailing reasons to go? There seem to be a few, so 
let’s take a look at them. One reason community college 
teachers should attend APA divisional meetings is that 
many such teachers are isolated. The full-time teachers are 
often the only full-time philosophers in their institutions. 
They don’t have other philosophers with whom to discuss 
philosophy on a daily basis. There are usually a handful 
or more of adjuncts teaching, but they tend to teach their 
classes and then leave to work another job. Conferences 
like the APA annual meetings allow faculty to talk about the 
subject they love at a deeper level than that of the freshman 
and sophomore classroom. As we tell our students, more 
learning often happens outside of the classroom. We 
should understand that the same is true for teachers in that 
they too learn from conversations with peers. 
Second, community college teachers need to know the 
latest research findings. As mentioned, they generally 
don’t do research for publication. They don’t have their 
work scrutinized by peers for adequacy. Yet, they do need 
to make sure their knowledge and skills are up to date. The 
APA can help in some ways to fulfill faculty development in 
their discipline. The newest research on the philosophy of 
mind or epistemology should be available at APA meetings 
for faculty to know where the research is headed even if 
they are not participating in it. Philosophy is not a field 
that changes quickly like computer science. Nonetheless, 
progress is made and new ideas are presented, and the 
APA meetings are where those ideas are tested. 
Some community college teachers might respond that they 
don’t need to know the latest research to teach introductory 
classes to freshmean and sophomores. They are teaching 
the big, broad survey of perennial fundamental issues in 
philosophy. One reply is that advanced knowledge does 
improve the teaching of introductory classes. Graduate 
degrees are required to teach at community colleges for 
this reason. That said, this response is partially true. The 
introductory class does not require familiarity with the 
latest advanced research for it to be successful. But the 
teachers should know where the research is headed. They 
should be able to guide students that want to study more 
philosophy into areas that are currently being debated 
in the literature. Many professional philosophers started 
at two-year colleges. These classes pointed them in the 
direction of their research today. Also, many colleges offer 
honors sections that encourage deeper thought or research 
on current issues. So, the instructor must know what 
topics are hot and the current well-respected research. 
Undergraduate research is a way for students to dip their 
toes into topics that might lead to lifelong pursuits. 
Lastly, community college instructors should keep their 
minds engaged. It is easy to just coast at a community 
college. Instructors have their classes worked out and don’t 
need to change them much. Both students and instructors 
may like their classes just the way they are. Months and years 
can go by without instructors adding much to their classes 
or even reading any material beyond what is required for 
their classes. Good instructors, though, need to keep their 
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minds alive. They need to be constantly practicing, as they 
did in graduate school, to learn and master new material. 
Young instructors are often the best teachers because their 
skills are honed and their passion for the subject is clear. 
Good older teachers have similar traits. 
So, it seems that community college instructors do have 
many good reasons to attend an APA divisional meetings 
even as they currently are formatted. Yet, are there actions 
that the APA can take to encourage their attendance? One 
action that the APA could take is to survey instructors from 
two-year colleges to discover why they attend or don’t 
attend. The list above is likely not exhaustive, and a survey 
will allow reasons to be quantified and ranked. 
This knowledge would help the APA make changes to its 
current meeting structure. Even without that information, 
there seem to be several changes that could be made. 
One important change to be made is to directly offer 
professional development education for people who teach. 
There should be more sessions dedicated to the specific 
issues faced by philosophers who teach freshman and 
sophomore classes. 
One way to achieve this goal would be to establish APA 
credentialing. Classes could be set up at APA divisional 
meetings to help teachers to get up to date on the latest 
research. The research updates would be pitched to the 
generalist. The Eastern Ddivision might offer a class on the 
latest updates in the philosophy of mind. The Central could 
offer the latest advancements in logic. And the Pacific might 
offer a class on current debates in the philosophy of religion. 
All of these would be taught by prominent researchers in 
the field. Community college instructors are like general 
practitioners in medicine and should have to keep up with 
their broad-based knowledge as general practitioners do 
with continuing medical education. There may not need to 
be tests given, but certification could be given to attendees 
of such training sessions. This certification would help 
with a community college’s accreditation by ensuring 
the discipline-specific professional development of their 
faculty. Accreditation bodies would know that instructors 
have made efforts to improve their knowledge and skills by 
attending such certification sessions. 
These classes could be an additional form of revenue for 
the APA. Community college instructors would likely have 
more success getting funding for conferences if there were 
clear benefits such as discipline-centered certification. The 
certification would be in addition to the normal papers that 
are presented at the conference, and this training might 
even make community college instructors more interested 
in attending colloquium paper presentations in areas that 
are being covered in generalist classes. The generalist 
classes, in fact, might highlight sessions that are being 
offered to further instructors’ training. 
As a part of this certification or as a part of the main session, 
there should also be open sessions on how to teach 
various courses. What are the best texts, assignments, and 
techniques for these courses? Such sessions take place at 
conferences such as the American Association of Philosophy 
Teachers, but they should also be a core component of APA 
sessions. Even avid researchers generally have to teach an 
introduction to philosophy or introduction to ethics class 
and could benefit from such sessions. One of the more 
memorable times that I had at an APA meeting was when 
a publisher wanted to develop new introductory texts and 
asked a dozen of us our opinions of the books that we 
use and books that we would like to see developed. We 
all ended up enjoying the roundtable discussion of our 
successes and failures with various books and teaching 
ideas. 
These sessions would then help to increase interaction 
between community college teachers and instructors at 
four-year colleges and universities. The smokers (evening 
receptions) allow for interaction between people and are 
fun events. But most of the interaction is between people 
who have worked together doing research and presented 
together. The more sessions that integrate a variety of 
groups, the more networking that occurs afterwards. 
There could even be sessions at the APA meetings that 
specifically try to educate community college teachers 
on what bachelor’s institutions expect from students that 
transfer from community colleges. Classes transfer more 
easily between institutions when teachers at each school 
know each other. 
These changes would make community college teachers 
more likely to attend annual APA meetings. With the APA 
focusing on what teachers need most, community college 
faculty would have multiple reasons to attend beyond 
those that currently obtain. The APA should not lose its 
focus on promoting scholarship within the profession. On 
the other hand, it must not neglect to facilitate the teaching 
of philosophical issues and analytical skills to society. For 
philosophy and society to flourish, good philosophers 
need to be developed in both Ivy League halls and local 
community centers. 
The APA’s mission is to promote the discipline and 
profession of philosophy at all levels. This is a wide mission 
that involves both skilled researchers and gifted teachers. 
Many of these people work at community colleges in the 
United States and around the world. These teachers are 
an integral part of the profession. They serve millions of 
students and promote philosophy in their communities 
every day. It is time that the APA recognizes their talents, 
importance, and needs. With a few changes and a little work, 
the APA could attract new members and a new audience to 
their annual meetings. The result would serve to expand 
the organization, help community college teachers, and 
advance advocacy of the broad importance of philosophy. 
Pursuing Reality: A Strawsonian Model 
Robert Boyd 
FRESNO CITY COLLEGE 
We see the puppets dancing on their miniature 
stage, moving up and down as the strings pull 
them around, following the prescribed course of 
their various little parts. We learn to understand the 
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logic of this theater and we find ourselves in its 
motions. We locate ourselves in society and thus 
recognize our own position as we hang from its 
subtle strings. For a moment we see ourselves 
as puppets indeed. But then we grasp a decisive 
difference between the puppet theater and our 
own drama. Unlike the puppets, we have the 
possibility of stopping in our movements, looking 
up and perceiving the machinery by which we have 
been moved. In this act lies the first step towards 
freedom. 
– Peter Berger, Invitation to Sociology (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1966), last paragraph 
Socrates provided the mandate for doing philosophy— 
know thyself. Fresno City College, the second oldest 
two-year college in the United States, offers four distinct 
“introductory” courses in its philosophy program. One 
of these courses places an emphasis on theories of 
knowledge and reality, and, for this course, I have found 
using Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy and Strawson’s 
Analysis and Metaphysics: An Introduction to Philosophy a 
great way to introduce students to the subject matter and 
stimulate their interest in the discipline as well as laying 
a foundation on which they can begin their own process 
of fulfilling Socrates’ mandate.1 In this brief paper, I wish 
to present a Strawsonian model based on his Analysis and 
Metaphysics that enables reasoners to know themselves 
better as they try to make sense of the world around 
them.2 From his notion that we are concept-users and 
that analytical philosophy should seek connections, Peter 
Strawson develops a powerful conceptual framework for 
pursuing an understanding of reality that is versatile and 
insightful, telling us something about both the external 
world and the individual attempting to understand it. 
Strawson’s methodology stimulates discussions on a 
number of relevant topics such as what is knowledge, what 
is reality, and how should we pursue philosophical analysis? 
The purpose of this paper is to clarify Strawson’s project of 
conceptual analysis as an approach to analytic philosophy 
and to show how it helps fulfill Socrates’ mandate. In the 
first section we begin with three conjectures that must 
be laid bare if we are to understand this presentation of 
Strawson. The second section presents Strawson’s process 
of “knowing” the external world, including his conceptual­
connectivist model. In the final section we will consider 
the viability of his strategy as a means to fulfill Socrates’ 
mandate. 
I 
Peter F. Strawson is well known for his Performative Theory 
of Truth.3 
The Performative Theory of Truth argues that 
ascribing truth to a proposition is not really 
characterizing the proposition itself, nor is it 
saying something redundant. Rather, it is telling 
us something about the speaker’s intentions. The 
speaker—through his or her agreeing with it, 
endorsing it, praising it, accepting it, or perhaps 
conceding it—is licensing our adoption of (the 
belief in) the proposition. Instead of saying, “It is 
true that snow is white,” one could substitute “I 
embrace the claim that snow is white.” The key 
idea is that saying of some proposition, P, that it is 
true is to say in a disguised fashion “I commend P 
to you,” or “I endorse P,” or something of the sort.4 
That is, when an individual says, “I know X,” they are not, 
according to Strawson, to be understood as advocating 
the three distinct claims as found in the tri-part view of 
knowledge, e.g., 1) they have a belief about X, 2) they 
have reasons for believing X, and 3) X is true. For Strawson, 
such claims as “I know X” simply says something about the 
speaker. The speaker is saying that he or she agrees with X. 
As an ordinary language philosopher, Strawson’s position 
should not be surprising, for frequently, people use the “to 
know” verb simply as a means to show their approval to 
some proposition. In Analysis and Metaphysics, Strawson 
does not present his performative theory; however, this 
theory is consistent with the Strawsonian model presented 
in the next section of this paper. While this writer finds 
Strawson’s performative theory of truth appealing, an 
appraisal of it is another issue and outside the scope of 
this paper.5 
The second conjecture that needs to be laid bare, and 
which may appear inconsistent with Strawson’s vision of 
doing philosophy, is my assumption that, frequently, we 
must meet our students where they are and move forward 
from there. In the preface of Analysis and Metaphysics, 
Strawson rightly claims, “There is no shallow end in the 
pool of philosophy.” Yet the purpose of this paper attempts 
to plunge us into a “shallower end.” This will require a 
simplification of Strawson’s vision. Peter Strawson does not 
present the diagrams that we will find in the next section, 
but they do illustrate his conceptual analysis. In spite of 
this “simplification,” we will see the complexity of the 
Strawsonian model.6 
My final conjecture is the assumption that when we seek to 
understand ourselves and the world in which we seem to 
exist, we are seeking knowledge about what we perceive 
to be real. This understanding is seldom obtained by an 
instantaneous experience; rather, it involves the process
of obtaining knowledge. Whether that process is one of 
decomposition or identifying conceptual mappings, an 
individual must determine what process works best for 
them. Strawson’s conceptual analysis is simply one option. 
II 
For Strawson the process for obtaining knowledge and 
understanding begins with an individual “perceiving” an 
object that is external to the perceiver, and that which is 
perceived is found in the objective world. The perceiver 
asks the basic question, “What is it?” Is it simply sense data 
or can more be gleaned? We begin with a very basic picture 
of an individual engaging the external world (Figure 1). 
This starting point is not immune to objections; however, it 
reflects Strawson’s pragmatic common sense and has been 
shared by many other philosophers such as G. E. Moore. 
Elements of this picture should be made explicit. First, the 
methodology for obtaining new data, new input, is not limited 
to the visual sensory apparatuses. Second, the perceiver 
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6Our task is to connect this logical notion with two others: on the one hand with the ontological
notion of the objective reality about which we judge; on the other hand with the
epistemological notion of experience which alone gives sense and content to our judgements.15
The picture I have developed from reading Strawson is that of a prism that the concept-user looks
through as he or she views the object. (In Figure 2, the prism, a form of Kantian rose-colored glasses, is 
represented by a triangle.)
This prism is not, as Strawson puts it, a staged operation. That is, his model allows different perceivers
to enter the prism from different angles or perspectives. Furthermore, each of the three components of
the prism is independent, yet connected to the other two components. We might offer the following 
diagram (Figure 3) :
Logic
6
Our task is to connect this logical notion with two others: on the one hand with the ontological
notion of the objective reality about which we judge; on the other hand with the
epistemological notion of experience which alone gives sense and content to our judgements.15
The picture I have developed from reading Strawson is that of a prism that the concept-user looks
through as he or she views the object. (In Figure 2, the prism, a form of Kantian rose-colored glasses, is 
represented by a triangle.)
?
This prism is not, as Strawson puts it, a staged operation. That is, his model allows different perceivers
to enter the prism from different angles or perspectives. Furthermore, each of the three components of
the prism is independent, yet connected to the other two components. We might offer the following 
diagram (Figure 3) :
4
This starting point is not immune to objections; however, it reflects Strawson’s pragmatic common
sense and has been shared by many other philosophers such as G. E. Moore. Elements of this picture
should be made explicit. First, the methodology for obtaining new data, new input, is not limited to the
visual sensory apparatuses. Second, the perceiver is not the object of observation. Third, there is an 
object, external from the perceiver, being observed. This object is not caused or brought into existence
by the perceiver. It exists independently of the perceiver. This move takes us away from the traditional
British idealism of Berkeley or Bradley. Strawson calls our perceiver a concept-user. “The concept-user’s 
awareness of the world is awareness from a certain spatial point of view at any moment.”7 While sense 
perception does not guarantee true judgments, “a feature of our ordinary scheme of thought [is that] 
sense perception . . . yield judgements which are generally or usually true.”8 As a result the perceiver
does not immediately reject the sense-data, but inquires whether his/her initial understanding of the
here and now experience of perception is accurate. Russell raised this same problem when he claimed
that we cannot question whether we have sense-data, but we must question what the sense-data is
about given that they are private.9
The history of philosophy provides a number of models intended to help answer this basic
question. For those of us who have taught these various models, we understand that each model, while
offering a particular strength or positive feature, ultimately fails to be satisfactory in all cases where the
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Figure 1. is not the 
object of 
observation.
Third, there 
? is an object, 
external from 
the perceiver, 
b e i n g  
o b s e r v e d .  
This object 
is not caused or brought into existence by the perceiver. 
It exists independently of the perceiver. This move takes 
us away from the traditional British idealism of Berkeley or 
Bradley. Strawson calls our perceiver a co cept-user. “The 
conc pt-user’s awar e s of the world is aware es  from a 
certain spatial point of view at any moment.”7 While sense 
perception does not guarantee true judgments, “a feature of 
our ordinary scheme of thought [is that] sense perception . . 
. yield judgements which are generally or usually tru .”8 As a 
result the perceiver does not immediately reject the sense-
data, but inquires whether his/her initial understanding of 
the here and now experience of perception is accurate. 
Russell raised this same problem when he claimed that we 
can ot qu sti n whether we have sens -data, but w  must 
question what the sense-data is about given that they are 
private.9 
The histo  of p il sophy provides a numb r of models 
intended to help answer this basic question. For those of us 
who have taught these various models, we understand that 
each model, while offering a particular strength or positive 
feature, ultimately fails to be satisfactory in all cases where 
the question is asked. For example, the correspondence 
theory may be very helpful in most cases involving empirical 
objects, but it fails in cases involving non-empirical objects 
such as spirits or numbers or thoughts. Frequently, as 
teachers of philosophy, after teaching our students each of 
the basic models, we concede that any theory by itself is 
probably inadequate. While each is viable in its own limited 
way, each, ultimately, is too simplistic. Russell developed 
a methodology of reductionism, i.e., always moving in the 
direction of greater simplicity, which still holds sway over 
that school of philosophy we call analytical philosophy 
and provides a staged process of inquiry, a process of 
reduction, until we achieve some basic or foundational 
point. From the beginning of Strawson’s career, his foil was 
Russell, and on this issue Russell continues to be the one 
Strawson opposes. Strawson denies a staged process.10 He 
proposes a model that allows for greater flexibility, but in 
doing so becomes much more complex. 
Peter Strawson proposes a model that results in his 
connectivistic approach to analytical philosophy.11 He 
proposes that the perceiver does not perceive the object in 
its raw state. While the object exists whether it is perceived 
or not, the perceiver or concept-user does interpret the 
data, hence creating a subjective perception of the object. 
For Strawson this places an emphasis on conceptual ways 
of talking about the world. “By talking about our conceptual 
structure, the structure of our thought about the world, 
rather than, as it were, directly about the world, we keep 
a firmer grasp of our own philosophical procedure, a 
clearer understanding of what we are about.”12 Given this 
conceptual emphasis, Strawson addresses the connection 
between judgment, concept, and experience. He claims 
that “[t]he connection is . . . that concepts of the real can 
mean nothing to the user of them except in so far as they 
relate, directly or indirectly, to possible experience of the 
real.”13 This, he claims, is the central tenet of empiricism. 
“[E]xperience not only bridges the gap between Subject 
and Object, but also gives the concepts we use all their 
sense of content.”14 However, he warns of moves that allow 
experience to swallow up our notions of objective reality. 
This raises the application of logic, which provides a form 
for judgment and its fundamental functions. 
Our task is to connect this logical notion with two 
others: on the one hand with the ontological notion 
of the objective reality about which we judge; on 
the other hand with the epistemological notion of 
experience which alone gives sense and content 
to our judgements.15 
The picture I have devel ped from reading Str wso  is that 
of a prism that the concept-user looks through as he or she 
views the object. (In Figure 2, the prism, a form of Kantian 
rose-colored glasses, is represented by a tr angl .) 
Figur  2. 
?
This prism is not, as Strawson puts it, a staged operation. 
That is, his model allows different perceivers to enter the 
prism from different angles or perspectives. Furthermore, 
each of the three components of the rism is inde endent, 
yet connected to the other two comp ne ts. We might 
offer the following diagram (Figure 3): 
Figure 3. As we consider this prism, 
which may be understood as 
the first layer of Strawson’s 
conceptual apparatus in 
our pursuit of truth/reality, 
we want to remember that 
it is not a staged structure. 
As a result, some concept-
Logic
Epistemology Ontology
users may enter the prism 
via epistemology, others 
through logic, and yet still others penetrate the structure 
by means of ontological issues. Furthermore, there is no 
set “second step” in the process. One might begin with 
epistemological issues and follow that with logical concerns 
or pursue ontological concerns. As to be expected, the third 
step, also, is not staged—resulting in an unchoreographed 
dance and in which circularity or redundant steps are 
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9As he unfolds the implications of these platitudes, Strawson claims that we discover another level
“within” our previous prism. He proposes a critical relationship between language, knowledge, and 
truth. This produces a new diagram or model (see Figure 4).
The unstaged process now becomes even richer and at the same time more difficult or complex.
Finally in chapter 8, Strawson develops the connections between thought, understanding, and 
meaning, and they compose another layer to Strawson’s prism model. Hence, we might present
Strawson’s model as seen in Figure 5:
Strawson’s Conceptual Framework for Pursuing Truth
Logic
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possible. Whereas Russell’s methodology of reductionism 
finds circularity problematic, Strawson embraces it as an 
important possibility in the pursuit of truth.16 
While Strawson is an empiricist, he rejects classical 
empiricism. For Strawson classical empiricism has the 
defining characteristic “that one or another of these 
approaches—or some composite variant of them—must 
be right, that they are exhaustive of the possibilities.”17 
Furthermore, classical empiricists incorporate a 
complementary error. 
Internalism treats the inner subjective life of 
thoughts, sensations, and inner experience in 
general as a series of unproblematic private 
entities—and regards the physical world as 
problematic. Externalism treats the physical world 
of bodies moving and interacting in space as 
unproblematic and the subjective and inner life as 
problematic.18 
Strawson maintains that both are necessary. We are “agents, 
beings capable of action . . . and we are social beings.”19 It 
is this dual function that influences our interaction with the 
world around us. As a result, 
over time we build up a picture of the world in 
which we occupy at any moment a perceptual point 
of view; which extends in space beyond the range 
of that point of view; and in which we distinguish, 
under concepts of such things, space-occupying 
individuals which have, as we have, past histories 
and, perhaps, a future.20 
But in order to make sense of this social construct, we must 
consider the role language plays in our developed thinking. 
Next, Strawson assembles some relevant platitudes: 
1)	 The beliefs of each concept-user are partly based 
on personal experience of the reality his beliefs are 
about; perception and memory together contribute 
to building up his picture of the world. . . . 
2)	 A great part—indeed the more developed a 
concept-user’s scheme of things, the greater that 
part—of a concept-user’s beliefs about objective 
reality are not based on personal experience of the 
objective reality the beliefs are about. . . . (Most 
beliefs are not first-hand.) 
3)	 … Some beliefs must be general beliefs. 
4)	 … Beliefs may conflict. 
5)	 … The need for consistency in beliefs. 
6)	 It is against the general background of a body of 
beliefs which as a whole is not in question at any 
given moment that the issue of whether or not 
to admit a new candidate, possibly at the cost of 
expelling an existing member, normally comes up. 
[We desire coherence.]21 
As he unfolds the implications of these platitudes, 
Strawson claims that we discover another level “within” our 
previous prism. He proposes a critical relationship between 
language, knowledge, and truth. This produces a new 
diagram or model (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. 
Logic
Language
Knowledge Truth
(S)
Epistemology Ontology
The unstaged process now becomes even richer and at the 
same time more diffi ult or complex. 
Finally in chapter 8, Strawson develops the connections 
between thought, understanding, and meaning, and they 
compose another layer to Strawson’s prism model. Hence, 
we might present Strawson’s model as seen in Figure 5: 
Figure 5. 
At each level the connections are not staged; hence the 
model allows for an infinite number of steps should they be 
required to achieve the desired results. Furthermore, while 
Strawson presents the three levels in the specified order, 
I do not believe his connectivism requires first penetration 
of the outer prism, i.e., {logic, epistemology, ontology}, 
then the second, i.e., {language, knowledge, truth}, and, 
finally, the third, i.e., {thought, understanding, meaning}. 
When discussing persons in this particular work, he claims 
that any characterization that emphasizes the “inner” 
person or the “outer” person is misguided as a holistic 
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picture. Inner and outer are simply different perspectives 
of the same person. The conceptual framework of Strawson 
allows one, as they first engage new data, to begin with 
questions regarding meaning or understanding or thought. 
Furthermore, his model highlights the connections among 
logic, language, and thought, among epistemology, 
knowledge, and understanding, and among ontology, 
truth, and meaning. Strawson’s conceptual model is 
intended to be flexible to the degree that is required, 
making it an extremely powerful, yet practical, method 
for discovering truth/reality or obtaining knowledge. One 
investigates the inner workings of the prism to the extent 
required by the new data. Obviously, when driving a car 
and seeing another car in your lane come toward you, you 
would not work through the infinite steps of the prism, but 
rather would immediately understand the implications of 
the situation and make appropriate changes. However, 
when confronted with a more complex abstract idea such 
as God, then the reasoner who is pursuing truth would do 
well to struggle through the process. 
III 
Given this description of Strawson’s model for pursuing 
reality/truth, how are we to briefly evaluate it? First, I believe 
his model bodes well with empirical evidence. We are all 
aware that our perception of an object is always from a 
point of view. Russell also made this point as he discussed 
our perception of the table in “Appearance and Reality.”22 
Second, when compared to alternative models, Strawson’s 
fares well. Strawson’s model assumes the objective 
existence of other objects; they are not products of our 
minds. They actually exist. However, unlike some models 
of objectivism, Strawson understands the complexity of 
perception and that the concept-user is not neutral as 
he/she engages external objects. This understanding is 
an improvement over the typical naïve correspondence 
theories commonly held.23 Third, I believe Strawson’s 
model for pursuing reality is quite viable. Not only is it 
plausible, but also, if correct, it provides direction for 
further investigations. It builds on Kant without embracing 
some of the problematic positions of Kant. However, is 
Strawson’s position internally consistent? 
Can we make sense of Strawson’s subjectivity approach to 
reality? Is Strawson inconsistent with his emphasis on the 
subjective nature of a concept-user and his claim that there 
is a reality being observed? Panayot Butchvarov challenges 
Strawson’s position on this point, but Strawson’s reply to 
Butchvarov is most insightful.24 Strawson does not deny the 
relativity of reallys, nor is his position open to the charge 
of equivocation. Those types of charges miss the point, 
according to Strawson. 
What I have been contending is that we are not humanly 
capable of appreciating the force and legitimacy of both 
viewpoints and even—though rarely, if ever, at the same 
time—of occupying both. So the point, ultimately, is a point 
about ourselves. And there is nothing wrong with that. ‘The 
proper study of mankind is man’. It is at least a large part, if 
not the whole, of the proper study of philosophy.25 
Even the pursuit of reality tells us something about 
ourselves. It helps us fulfill the mandate of Socrates—know 
thyself. 
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